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FOREWORD 
In recent years, politicians and economic-policy decision makers pay increasing atten-
tion to the processes in the Southeast European region on account of its diminishing 
economic and political risks, and accelerating or stabilizing high-level growth, i.e. fac-
tors which have all appreciated the area. Consequently, foreign investors show a grow-
ing interests in the terrain as they attach high hopes to market opportunities that may 
yield substantial market expansion and profit gains. 
However, despite the undisputable stabilization, the economic processes of the region 
leave a set of questions open. On the one hand, the conditions of sustainable develop-
ment have only evolved in the smaller part of the region, while several countries are 
still being engaged in creating the foundations of economic activity, eliminating serious 
imbalances and introducing market reforms, on the other. Favourable processes can be 
enhanced as policies of the European Union towards the region – characterized by 
ambivalence in the nineties – have become unambiguous. Relations between the EU and 
Southeast Europe received a sounder framework, although the integration process in 
most Balkan countries is in an initial phase, yet. 
Besides stabilization, the acceleration of privatization processes in the area facilitated 
the more active presence of foreign investors. In some countries foreign-owned firms 
or enterprises with foreign participation already contribute to improving the structure 
of economy and easing unemployment. Hungarian companies enter the region in grow-
ing numbers too, though there are only firms of larger size that dominate investment 
activity, so far. Smaller firms confine themselves to invest in a limited circle of coun-
tries. 
In our opinion, it must be treated as a priority that Hungary’s relations with South-
east Europe should help diversify Hungarian foreign trade and improve the growth 
prospects of the economy by additional impulses. The analysis of the processes outlined 
above has belonged to the major research fields of the Institute for World Economics 
for years. In this number of Working Papers we examine the features of development 
and the factors influencing investment in the region (Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia 
and Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania) from the viewpoint of 
the European integration and the Hungarian economy. 
 
 
 
 
  
5
GROWTH PROCESSES AND THEIR SUSTAINABILITY 
IN THE SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN REGION 
Tamás Novák 
1) STABILISATION OF THE 
SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN 
REGION 
During the past 4-5 years economic sta-
bilisation in the Southeast European 
countries has been a common feature. 
GDP growth rates are relatively high, the 
rate of inflation is low or it is moderat-
ing, foreign direct investments are on the 
increase due to decreasing regional risks 
and comparably low production costs. 
Despite the quite similar processes in 
these countries, the region itself is far 
from being a more or less unified eco-
nomic area, neither in terms of economic 
development, nor in international rela-
tions. There are huge differences between 
them regarding per capita income, pace 
of economic transformation and the po-
tential economic and political risks. In-
traregional economic relations continue to 
be limited in spite of the strong impetus 
coming from abroad (Stabilisation and 
Association Process i.e. the objective of 
establishing regional free trade), and 
complementarity is very small between 
production structures. Meeting the acces-
sion requirements of the EU are ham-
pered by distorted economic structures. 
In certain countries technological back-
wardness makes the modernisation of 
economic structure especially difficult 
due to extremely high capital require-
ments (for example Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Albania). 
The region in economic sense can be 
considered as a 3+4 structure. Three 
countries have better prospects for EU 
accession (Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia), 
while the prospects for the other four 
countries are very vague. In economic 
terms the situation in Romania and Bul-
garia in regional comparison is quite 
good partly due to earlier started trans-
formation and to the increasing adjust-
ment needs associated with the EU inte-
gration process. From the economic-
situation point of view, the Western Bal-
kans require relatively similar handling. 
(Croatia is outstanding from this group 
owing to its economic development level 
and the stability of its economic struc-
tures.) 
Although the growth trends in the re-
gion are similar, the growth factors may 
differ from country to country. The first 
group consists of countries that have 
stronger market-economic bases and 
grow quickly, structural reforms are 
relatively well advanced, FDI inflow is 
strong and develops capacities for satis-
fying export needs or domestic demand. 
The countries of this group have con-
cluded EU talks or are already in acces-
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sion negotiations. In their case, in spite 
of some alarming signs, only the rate of 
growth is the question. In the second 
group, countries initiated some reforms 
in economic transformation under fa-
vourable international economic condi-
tions. These reforms are either the start-
ing of longer-term structural reforms, 
the speeding up of privatisation, or tem-
porary artificial business support. The 
sustainability of artificial business support 
is questionable and recession can surely 
be expected in case of a slowdown in 
reforms or worsening international condi-
tions. To the third group those countries 
belong that experience positive business 
cycle as a result of relative stabilisation 
of regional political environment, interna-
tional aid and support, and related for-
eign direct investments. In these countries 
the long-term real-economic base is miss-
ing, the development of production ca-
pacities requires a longer time and the 
results are not certain at all. If aid de-
pendence could not be replaced with 
real-economic base, the economic devel-
opment cannot be well established in the 
long run. Between the second and the 
third group there is no firm demarking 
line, countries belong to one or the other 
group alternatively. When judging the 
potentials of the region an additional as-
pect is that the business cycle in the re-
gion is currently different from the one 
experienced in Western and Central 
Europe. The catching up of Central and 
Southeast European countries with the 
developed West entails substantial con-
vergence process that sooner or later 
leads to the synchronisation of growth 
processes, too. The Southeast European 
region is at the beginning of this con-
vergence process which means a substan-
tial growth difference compared with the 
developed Western European countries. 
This situation drives companies in the 
more developed countries, where growth 
rates are much lower, to invest into this 
high-growth region that offers further 
business opportunities and secure con-
tinuous company growth. 
While the situation of Romania and 
Bulgaria is stabilised in the long run by 
EU membership, the economic develop-
ment of the Western Balkans, shaped by 
political and security-policy processes, 
can be structured along three scenarios 
that basically determine the prospects for 
the next 5-6 years. 
∗ Large economic setback in the region’s 
economic development: intensification 
of regional rivalry, increasing interna-
tional isolation. The setback may differ 
from country to county, but this may 
destroy the region’s favourable per-
ception in the rest of the world. Some 
countries may drift to the periphery 
and the integration perspectives 
worsen. 
∗ Step by step integration: internal sta-
bility, strengthening of international 
cooperation, solid internal security 
situation, continuous fulfilment of ac-
cession conditions.  
∗ Progressive integration: successful do-
mestic transformation, strengthening 
regional stability, EU membership, 
market economy. 
Given these framework conditions the 
economic perspectives for the next years 
seem to be favourable. Investment expec-
tations are positive in the wake of eco-
nomic stabilisation, advantageous cost 
factors, expanding markets, and in some 
cases even privatisation supply is promis-
ing. 
It is extremely important to note that 
the majority of Western Balkan countries 
are entirely depend on foreign transfers. 
The efficient transformation of domestic 
economies at present is not possible from 
own resources only. That is why the sta-
bilisation and association process and its 
coordinated donor policy is a most im-
portant condition. 
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2) GROWTH PROCESSES 
The economic development level of the 
Southeast European countries heavily lags 
behind that of the Central European 
countries. Calculated on purchasing 
power parity (PPP) per capita GDP in 
the region ranges from 25% to 47% of 
EU25 average. 
 
Calculated at current exchange rate, 
the low development level of the region 
is even more obvious. According 
to the data for 2004, per capita 
GDP is only 6.5-11% of EU15 av-
erage (without Croatia). 
The majority of the countries 
even in 2005 did not reach the 
pre-transition GDP level, the far-
est from which are Serbia and 
Bosnia. (These two countries suf-
fered the largest loss in the mid-
dle of the nineties, but their 
growth performance today is not 
much better than those of the 
other countries from the region, 
thus their relative position cannot 
improve substantially.) 
During the past five years the average 
growth rate has surpassed 5% in Bul-
garia, Romania, Albania, and it was very 
close to that in Serbia, Macedonia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, the simple 
growth rates can hide some qualitative 
factors that can significantly modify the 
judgement of the growth processes. 
While some of the countries show a 
relatively stable growth, in other cases 
there are significant changes year by 
year due either to outside business cycle 
or to modifications in economic policy 
(privatisation, domestic de-
mand, etc.). After the stabi-
lisation program introduced 
in 1997 Bulgaria has en-
tered into a sustained and 
relatively high growth-rate 
period, as Romania did it 
after 2001. Albania and 
Bosnia have developed rela-
tively quickly and without 
bigger fluctuations during 
the past few years, but 
these two countries are the 
least developed ones in the 
region. On the other hand, 
Serbia and FYROM show 
large fluctuations, unfa-
vourable domestic or for-
eign processes easily destabilise these 
countries. After the very fast economic 
growth in 2004, in 2005 a certain 
Table 2 
Per capita GDP as % of EU15 average 
(calculated at exchange rate) 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Albania 5.13 6.49 6.70 6.92 7.99 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 5.93 6.22 6.38 6.65 6.77 
Bulgaria 7.31 8.10 8.61 9.14 9.75 
Croatia 19.66 21.09 22.34 23.27 24.30 
FYROM 8.39 7.96 8.12 8.20 8.30 
Romania 7.84 8.45 9.11 9.44 10.62 
Serbia 3.85 6.50 8.25 9.02 9.26 
Hungary 21.63 23.96 27.80 29.02 31.23 
EU15 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat data 
Table 1 
Per capita GDP as % of EU25 average 
(PPP) 
 
 1991 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Albania 10 15 15 19 19 20 20 
Bosnia-Herzegovina - - 25 25 26 26 27 
Bulgaria 35 31 27 28 29 30 30 
Croatia 42 37 41 42 44 45 46 
FYROM 30 25 26 24 25 25 25 
Romania 37 37 25 26 26 30 32 
Serbia - - 24 24 24 24 24 
Hungary 51 49 53 56 58 60 61 
EU25 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Eurostat, WIIW 
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slowdown took place in the majority of 
the countries. 
3) SUSTAINABILITY 
The key factor of future development in 
the whole region is the sustainability of 
current growth rates. Besides the appli-
cation of convenient economic policy, the 
international processes also play an im-
portant role (especially the achievement 
of EU membership or its concrete prom-
ise), but the preparedness of the institu-
tions, their capability for change also 
play a role. This problem does not affect 
each country equally; e.g. Bulgaria and 
Romania are more solidly based, not 
least because of their immediate EU ac-
cession, while the bases of the countries 
of former Yugoslavia are weaker. There 
can be significantly less problems in 
those countries where exports and in-
vestments play an important role in 
GDP growth. The basically domestic-
consumption-based growth is very sensi-
tive in these very small countries to in-
creasing current-account deficit.  
During the past years there were 
significant increases in household con-
sumption in Romania, Bulgaria and 
Croatia. On the one hand, the growth 
of consumption did not crowd out 
(private) investments, since they 
were partly supported by the tight 
budget and the huge foreign-
capital inflow. On the other hand, 
there were significant differences: 
while Bulgaria and Romania were 
able to acquire capital for pro-
ductive investments, the investment 
activity in Croatia concentrated on 
tourism and highway building, but 
the technological change in the 
economy was postponed. 
Each country examined is char-
acterised by large or very large 
unemployment rate and it has not 
decreased significantly in spite of sub-
stantial economic growth. Unemployment 
data are not very reliable, however. The 
various methodologies show very differ-
ent results. All in all, it can be seen that 
the unemployment rate fluctuates be-
tween 30-45% in Bosnia, FYROM and 
Serbia, and it is also very close to this 
band in Albania. These data refer to the 
lack of production capacities, the failed 
structural change and the weak employ-
ment-creating ability of the private sec-
tor. In certain countries the official un-
employment rates seem to be favourable, 
but these do not refer to successful ad-
justment, but rather the continuous post-
ponement of structural reforms that may 
lead to significant increases in unem-
ployment rates. (This effect is expected 
to be the largest in Romania.) 
While the managing of unemployment 
is an everyday economic-policy task, in 
Table 4 
Unemployment rate 
(% – LFS) 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Albania 16.8 16.4 15.8 15.0 14.4 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 38.0 39.2 40.9 42.0 42.8 
Bulgaria 16.9 19.7 17.8 13.6 11.9 
Croatia 16.1 15.9 14.8 14.3 13.8 
FYROM 32.3 30.5 31.9 36.7 37.2 
Romania 7.1 6.6 8.4 7.0 8.0 
Serbia 12.1 12.2 13.3 14.6 18.5 
Source: National statistical offices, central banks  
Table 3 
Real GDP growth 
(%) 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005*
Albania 7.3 7.6 4.7 6.0 5.9 6.5 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 5.9 4.5 5.5 3.0 5.0 5.0 
Bulgaria 5.4 4.1 4.9 4.5 5.6 5.5 
Croatia 2.9 4.4 5.2 4.3 3.8 3.0 
FYROM 4.5 -4.5 0.9 2.8 2.9 4.0 
Romania 2.1 5.7 5.1 5.2 8.3 5.5 
Serbia 5.2 5.1 4.5 2.4 8.6 4.0 
* forecast 
Source: National statistical offices, central banks,  
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the longer run demographic processes 
can also cause serious problems. This 
arises from negative population growth, 
fast increase of the elderly and the visi-
ble emigration of the younger generation. 
The opposite process, namely the immi-
gration, also creates very difficult situa-
tion as it is the case in Serbia-
Montenegro where the inflow of nearly 
700.000 people without employment 
creation resulted in serious problems.  
Inflation shows a favourable trend. 
Hyperinflation was everywhere stopped, 
and during the last years its rate has 
became one-digit, but its sustainability is 
questionable for many reasons. Firstly, 
the moderation of inflation was generally 
not accompanied by structural reforms. 
Secondly, several central price controls 
remained that should have been elimi-
nated (the later the liberalisation, the 
greater the price jump). Thirdly, 
in most of the countries the 
overvalued domestic currencies 
temporarily protect the country 
from imported inflation. It is a 
question how long this situation 
can be sustained as this may 
hamper exports and the devel-
opment of competitive product-
ion, and affects the companies 
producing to the domestic mar-
ket (due to the artificially low 
import prices). 
Another probably positive sign is the 
relatively low general government deficits 
(except for Croatia). The relatively bal-
anced budget is explained by the aban-
donment of independent exchange-rate 
policy (Bulgaria) or the postponement of 
structural reforms (Serbia, Romania), 
and sometimes by the obligation to meet 
the conditions of the international institu-
tions. However, an excessively fast de-
crease of deficit easily can have negative 
consequences (especially if the decrease 
was not accompanied by structural re-
forms; see the example of Croa-
tia). On the other hand, fiscal 
consolidation plays a very impor-
tant role in managing current-
account deficits. However, with-
out the implementation of struc-
tural reforms this is a stabilisa-
tion policy in vain as it results 
in lower GDP dynamics. Without 
growth impacts connected to 
structural change (reform) it is 
a question how growth could be 
quickened. The harmony between 
growth and balance is very dif-
ficult to find: in Bulgaria, own-
ing to structural reforms and 
decreasing budget deficit, growth re-
mained very quick; in Macedonia stabili-
sation was connected with slow growth 
while in Croatia imbalances increased 
parallel with the slowing of GDP growth. 
Table 5 
Average yearly inflation 
(%) 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005*
Albania 0.1 3.1 5.2 2.3 2.9 - 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 4.8 3.1 0.4 0.6 –0.4 2.5 
Bulgaria 10.3 7.4 5.8 2.3 6.2 4.5 
Croatia 6.2 4.9 1.7 1.8 2.1 3.3 
FYROM 5.8 5.5 1.8 1.2 –0.4 1.2 
Romania 45.7 34.5 22.5 15.3 11.9 9.0 
Serbia  79.6 93.3 16.6 9.9 11.4 15.0 
* forecast 
Source: Eurostat, national statistical offices 
Table 6
General government balance 
(as % of GDP) 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005*
Albania –7.5 –6.9 –6.0 –4.6 –4.6 - 
Bosnia-Herzegovina –7.0 –3.3 –0.2 0.8 0.4 0.0 
Bulgaria –0.6 –0.6 –0.7 0 1.7 1.5 
Croatia –6.5 –6.8 –4.8 –6.3 –4.9 –5.0 
FYROM 2.3 –6.3 –5.6 –1.6 –1.3 –1.5 
Romania –4.0 –3.2 –2.5 –2.3 –1.1 –1.0 
Serbia –0.9 –1.4 –4.5 –4.2 –1.7 0.5 
* forecast 
Source: Eurostat, national statistical offices,  
  
10 
One of the most important character-
istics of the regional economic processes 
is the high and further increasing for-
eign-trade deficit. Deficit is above 50% 
of GDP in Bosnia, close to 30% in Ser-
bia, and it ranges between 20-25% in 
Albania, Croatia and Macedonia, while it 
is “only” 10% in Bulgaria, Romania and 
Croatia. Foreign-trade deficit does not 
mean a barrier to growth until it 
can be financed from other sources 
(from other revenues or from riskless 
increase of foreign indebtedness). The 
very bad foreign-trade performance 
is not reflected entirely in the cur-
rent account. Some of the countries 
obtain substantial revenues from ser-
vices (Croatia, but Bulgaria too, 
started to receive increasing gains 
from tourism), and in other countries 
the large FDI inflow plays an impor-
tant role. Imbalances are further 
mitigated by unilateral transfers from 
abroad. Such transfers are ranging 
between 13 and 25% of GDP in Ser-
bia, Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia and Al-
bania, meaning that these transfers play 
an important role in the currently ex-
perienced relatively fast growth and rela-
tive macroeconomic stability.  
One may say that without the con-
tinuous huge inflow of FDI trade and 
current-account balances cannot be fi-
nanced in the medium term. In addition, 
smooth development is only expected un-
der these circumstances if foreign capital 
places emphasis on export-oriented de-
velopment rather than on domestic-
market activities. 
Although in recent 
years the capital in-
flow into the region 
has substantially in-
creased, the real 
breakthrough only 
took place in Bul-
garia, Romania and 
Croatia – in coun-
tries where EU talks 
have already re-
quired substantial 
adjustment, or 
where some unique conditions evolved. In 
the other countries capital inflow could 
not exert an overall impact, certain ser-
vices sectors and some well-positioned 
companies or branches became the target 
of FDI instead. 
 
A common problem in the region’s 
countries is the appreciation of domestic 
currencies. This process in some coun-
tries is the result of the catching-up 
process and it is connected to the devel-
opment of a more competitive economic 
structure. The strengthening of capital 
inflows also supports the appreciation. 
The most important reason behind the 
appreciation is, however, the very large 
difference between domestic and foreign 
inflation levels. None of the countries 
eliminated this effect by depreciating the 
local currency since the fight against in-
Table 7 
Balance of the current account and its components 
(as % of GDP) 
 
Trade balance Transfers Current account 
2002 2003 2002 2003 203 2004 
Albania –21.9 –19.6 13.7 13.6 –6.7 –4.4 
Bosnia-Herzegovina –58.4 –55.4 22.7 22.2 –24.5 –23.3 
Bulgaria –12.5 –14.0 3.4 3.5 –9.2 –7.4 
Croatia –27.3 –24.3 4.8 4.9 –6.9 –4.5 
FYROM –18.4 –20.9 15.9 14.7 –3.3 –7.7 
Romania –7.8 –9.0 4.0 4.2 –6.0 –7.5 
Serbia –24.2 –31.7 12.1 15.3 –9.2 –13.1 
Source: Central banks 
Table 8
FDI 
(EUR million) 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005*
Albania 155 232 151 158 275 -
Bosnia-Herzegovina 159 133 282 338 400 400
Bulgaria 1103 903 980 1851 2114 1800
Croatia 1142 1503 1195 1788 921 1100
FYROM 189 493 83 84 122 90
Romania 1147 1294 1212 1946 4098 4000
Serbia 55 186 502 1197 775 1500
* forecast 
Source: Central banks  
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flation and the maintenance of price sta-
bility is one of the most important eco-
nomic policy objectives in this region, not 
least because of the bitter experiences 
with inflation during the nineties. This 
strategy is reflected in pegged exchange 
rates in many countries, and the coun-
tries with currency-board regimes do not 
even have an independent monetary pol-
icy. This situation in the future may in-
fluence the flow of international capital 
as the overvalued currency with increas-
ing production costs may weaken the 
attractiveness of these countries for FDI. 
This could especially be unfavourable for 
the production and export of labour in-
tensive products (a clear example is the 
already high-wage-costs Croatia). 
In fact, each country in the region 
emphasises its willingness for long-term 
sustainable growth and the necessary 
structural changes. It can be seen, how-
ever, that the implementation of reforms 
in many countries depends on the condi-
tionality approach practiced by the inter-
national organisations. This conditionality 
means EU adjustment to Romania and 
Bulgaria while in case of the other coun-
tries only IMF and donor coordinators 
can force to implement the necessary but 
unwanted reforms. Risks are also associ-
ated with the frequent ambiguities in 
privatisation policies and the manifest 
distrust of foreign capital. 
 
 
* * * * * 
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PRIVATIZATION AND FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT ON THE BALKANS 
Miklós Szanyi
1) WHAT PRIVATIZATION IS 
GOOD FOR? 
Hungarian capital owners have the op-
portunity to invest abroad through par-
ticipating in foreign countries’ privatiza-
tion processes. Privatization was in some 
countries and in certain periods the pri-
mary tool of foreign investment. This will 
probably be also the case in some coun-
tries of the Balkans. Practice with priva-
tization showed important differences in 
various countries, and so the extent and 
ways of foreign participation also varied. 
It is therefore important to overview the 
background of privatization policies, first 
of all those political and economic goals 
that governments wanted to achieve, as 
well as the gathered empirical evidence 
up until these days. 
Privatization was not invented in the 
transition economies. The idea of privati-
zation first came up in the context of 
developed countries’ state-owned public-
utility service sectors in close relationship 
with the mainstream economic thought 
typical for the 1980’s, principally with 
the neoliberal approach. The economic 
role of the state was do be reduced in 
general, hence the direct involvement 
through state-owned companies was re-
garded especially disadvantageous. The 
companies that worked mostly on mo-
nopolistic market conditions were re-
garded by critics inefficient. The expecta-
tion was that a proper market regulation 
and the privatization together enabled 
firms to improve their operation. And if 
efficiency was not increased, losses were 
expected to be shifted over to consum-
ers, thus state budget was still relieved 
from financing the losses or inefficient 
operation. 
We must realize that the privatization 
tasks of transition economies largely dif-
fered from this neoliberal concept, which 
was also explicitly declared in the Wash-
ington Consensus. Privatization in these 
countries spread to a more substantial 
part of the economy and affected very 
heterogeneous groups of companies from 
the sectoral, financial aspects but also 
regarding operational conditions. There-
fore, the originally elaborated efficiency 
task of privatization did not came into 
the foreground in most cases. This pre-
condition of meaningful privatization was 
treated by governments axiomatic. In 
practice the real impact of privatization 
on corporate operations of former state-
owned firms was rarely reviewed. Where 
there was such review, it was always 
done ex post.  
It is therefore not very surprising that 
governments of transition economies tried 
to achieve a number of other political 
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and economic goals through privatiza-
tion, meanwhile they thought that opera-
tional efficiency of the privatized firms 
would improve automatically. Therefore, 
from the point of view of operational 
efficiency, undifferentiated privatization 
campaigns led to ever increasing func-
tional disorders of privatized firms, even 
if new owners were private. Such prob-
lems sometimes forced governments to 
rethink privatization concepts, the due 
consideration of operational efficiency. 
Sometimes renationalization and new pri-
vatization of former state companies was 
unavoidable.  
But what other goals did governments 
try to solve through privatization? We 
must first mention the quickest and full-
est possible elimination of political and 
economic structures of the previous 
communist regime. According to several 
renown economists and politicians the 
primary task of privatization in the tran-
sition economies was the marginalization 
of the political and economic exponents 
of the previous regime. We may also 
add, that the old cadres were to be re-
placed by a new elite. New cadres were 
to be supplied with adequate economic 
power. For example, in the former 
Czechoslovakia the new owners were ex-
pected to be the bourgeois middle class 
that the government wanted to 
strengthen (partly re-establish). In the 
Ukraine, just to mention another extreme 
policy, privatization was intended to di-
rectly support the new (?) political elite. 
Active policy makers were the primary 
beneficiaries of the privatization process. 
The main political content of privatization 
in most transition economies was there-
fore the direct or indirect political sup-
port of the new political elite. 
Some forms of privatization induced 
substantial capital flows. State-budget 
revenues could be directly increased 
through incomes from privatization sales. 
In case of selling to foreign investors the 
deal automatically improved also the 
current account. If additionally, govern-
ments used privatization revenues to re-
duce external debt, a third balance-
improving effect was achieved. Privatiza-
tion could therefore substantially improve 
the internal and external balance of 
transition economies.  
2) PRIVATIZATION PRACTICES 
YESTERDAY AND TODAY 
Governments of transition economies tried 
to facilitate the achievement of other im-
portant economic policy goals as well. 
The priorities differed from country to 
country and in time, too. The applied 
privatization methods also varied. Before 
starting the analysis of the privatization 
methods it is important to emphasize the 
role of the time factor. More precisely, 
we state that identical privatization 
methods worked differently and pro-
duced different results early in the tran-
sition process of Central and Eastern 
Europe than today. This has several rea-
sons. First of all, countries in the second 
and third wave of the transition process 
already possess the experience of the 
forerunner economies. The Czech Repub-
lic, Hungary and Poland applied rather 
different privatization methods, sometimes 
with success, sometimes without, and 
their experience is available now.  
On the other hand, transition process 
has affected the economies of the Bal-
kans for several years, even the least 
open Albanian and Serb economies. This 
means that governments have already 
started to solve the complex set of tran-
sition tasks. Some of these goals have 
been achieved or are being achieved. 
Therefore, governments may devote more 
time and effort for the thorough elabo-
ration of adequate privatization policies. 
It is of course another question how 
much they can utilize this opportunity. 
Most of the recent larger-scale privatiza-
tion deals have resulted in much sub-
stantial privatization revenues received 
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for state-owned companies and their 
concessions than in the early phase of 
the transition process. This is also due to 
the fact that foreign investors gathered 
sufficient experience in Central and East-
ern Europe, thus the investment risk of 
the region became moderate in the 
meantime. 
But the time that has passed since the 
start of the transition process could also 
have brought some negative consequences 
for the privatization process. There are 
rather many state-owned companies on 
the privatization market that can be kept 
operational only with substantial subsidies 
from the budget. The privatization of 
such companies has become increasingly 
difficult. The social requirements (in 
terms of employment, supply security, 
etc.) that impeded their sale before have 
not been reduced. This way these com-
panies have departed further from the 
norms of market economic principles. In 
some countries these anomalies are not 
isolated cases but regular practice. Com-
petitiveness of the Ukrainian heavy indus-
try was largely supported until recently 
through low energy prices guaranteed by 
bilateral agreements of Ukraine and Rus-
sia. When the agreement was cancelled, 
Ukrainian economy was threatened with 
immediate collapse. Similarly, in 
neighbouring Romania, up until the last 
phase of the EU accession negotiations, it 
was not clear if state paternalism or 
market-driven competition would deter-
mine economic actions. We can observe 
the same dilemma in the countries of the 
Western Balkans. After introducing these 
systemic aspects of transition we can 
turn our attention to the different priva-
tization methods that may play a role in 
the countries of the Balkans.  
Best known from the Hungarian prac-
tice is tender sale to high bidder, re-
garded as the most suitable method to 
find “real owners” that are adequate for 
the future needs of the privatized com-
panies. This can be domestic or foreign 
investor alike. Preference of one against 
the other depends on the general priori-
ties of governments. Very often govern-
ments reject foreign participation in pri-
vatization, or they allow it only in form 
of direct sales or invitation tenders. The 
exclusion of foreign participants may be 
disadvantageous from several aspects 
(lower sales revenue, less available capi-
tal for reorganization investments, 
weaker international competitiveness, 
etc.). Domestic investors pursue usually 
smaller adjustments in corporate activity 
that results in smaller drop in employ-
ment, and a more likely retaining of at 
least parts of the former supplier net-
work, which can be rather beneficial for 
the economy as a whole. 
The other main advantage of the ten-
der sale against other privatization tech-
niques is the higher revenue that can be 
collected by the state budget from the 
sales transaction. It is important also 
from this point of view that the transac-
tions are transparent and monitored, and 
corruption is reduced as much as possi-
ble. In fact, Balkan countries are in a 
favourable position in this regard. Priva-
tization is not a quick campaign. More 
time and effort can be devoted to the 
individual sales procedures. The problem 
here is therefore not a technical one but 
intentional: governments want to control 
and direct the redistribution of state as-
sets. There is no political will in many 
cases to organize open tender sales be-
cause not the economic but the political 
rationale determines the process of priva-
tization. There were several cases when 
liabilities of state companies were not 
fully listed prior to signing of the priva-
tization contract, which would have been 
unavoidable in case of an open tender 
process. Since there is no major privati-
zation sales campaign, privatization ten-
ders usually achieve high sales prices 
now. 
During open tenders foreign investors 
also may have an opportunity of partici-
pation. In the case of other privatization 
techniques there are only indirect possi-
bilities of foreign participation. Like in 
Hungary, also in the Balkan countries 
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the application of tender sales very much 
depends on the actual situation of the 
state budget and levels of external in-
debtedness. If there is no alternative so-
lution of restoring budget equilibrium it 
is very simple to use privatization reve-
nues for this purpose. From this aspect 
situation of Croatia and Serbia can be 
regarded as critical. Though in case of 
Serbia collective ownership models of 
state manufacturing industry makes pri-
vatization especially difficult also from 
the technical, judicial point of view. The 
situation is similar here to some prob-
lems of Polish privatization where exten-
sive worker participation as well as the 
special status Solidarnosc makes it diffi-
cult to sell some state-owned companies. 
The Hungarian experience also showed 
the importance of the active participation 
of corporate management in the process 
of privatization.  
The second basic privatization method 
is the distribution among the population 
coupons that represent ownership rights 
in state properties. This method can also 
be interesting for foreign investors, since 
though indirectly, this also enables them 
to participate in the privatization process. 
The main aim of this method was to 
create and strengthen the wealth of the 
middle class through the gratis distribu-
tion of vouchers. However, large parts 
of the middle class did not want to be-
come bourgeois and did not care much 
about the received ownership. Huge 
amounts of the coupons were sold to 
various agents before transferring them 
into real property. The concentration of 
real property rights continued after the 
transfer of coupons for corporate securi-
ties. In many cases controlling shares of 
the securities ended up in the hands of 
insider investors. Depending on details of 
regulation foreign investors could also 
establish companies that could participate 
in the collection of vouchers and corpo-
rate securities. Another opportunity of 
foreign participation was to purchase the 
collected securities from domestic funds. 
The essence of the privatization process 
through coupons was that despite of 
government will and the inclusion of sev-
eral intermediate stations, ownership 
rights were concentrated and transferred 
to either domestic or foreign strategic 
investors.  
Voucher privatization postponed cor-
porate adjustment process considerably. 
First-tire owners lacked devotion, skills as 
well as the necessary capital for active 
participation in corporate governance 
and adjustment. Coupons were collected 
primarily by agencies of state-owned 
banks in the Czech Republic. They were 
the same banks who were the major 
creditors of the “privatized” companies. 
In these cases the otherwise separated 
roles of the owner, creditor and policy 
maker interfered thus intensifying oppor-
tunism and in many cases also corrup-
tion. The result was continuous deterio-
ration of market positions and financial 
conditions of these firms. In the later 
phase of the privatization foreign inves-
tors also had to recover the accumulated 
financial and adjustment deficits. The po-
litical goals of voucher privatization were 
not achieved either. The incumbent man-
agement remained in position in most 
cases. Insiders could even strengthen 
their position through the voucher priva-
tization. 
There is, however, another, much less 
complicated and cheaper way of insider 
privatization. This is the simple distribu-
tion of state property among the clientele 
of the new political elite. This type of 
“client-privatization” becomes important 
in all those countries where there are no 
serious democratic traditions and institu-
tions (like in the CIS countries), or 
where privatization was started before 
setting up the democratic institutions 
(like in the Western Balkans). It is need-
less to analyze very long how much 
danger “client-privatization” means for 
corporate restructuring, institution build-
ing or the credibility of economic policy. 
Also, from the point of view of foreign 
investment this is the worse solution. Di-
rect participation is almost impossible or 
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bound to heavy corruption. The risks of 
indirect participation in form of buying 
out from the clientele are very high, too. 
In some countries, due to the absolute 
lack of democratic institutions, political 
leadership possesses state companies as if 
they were their own personal property. 
This situation is similarly not transparent 
and corrupt as the previously mentioned 
client-privatization. In such countries not 
only ways of obtaining property but also 
the basic legal conditions of corporate 
functioning are not clear or not properly 
regulated. It is therefore very difficult to 
obtain digestible information from state 
companies, since they work under condi-
tions that can change entirely after 
transforming ownership. Foreign investors 
restrain their interest in these countries 
to capturing markets, hence they can 
obtain concession for operation only if 
they purchase together with the conces-
sions the local service supplier. The 
brave pioneers are sometimes rewarded 
by very high revenues. If previous mar-
ket conditions are kept after privatization 
(e.g. market protection) an improvement 
in productivity and efficiency may bring 
very high rates of return on investment 
in these cases.  
There are further less important but 
not negligible methods of privatization. 
Assets of state firms can be purchased 
in bankruptcy procedures. Manage-
ment/employee buyouts were also fre-
quent. There was some kind of restitu-
tion in each transition country and many 
of them had campaigns of “small priva-
tization” (sale of retail shops, small 
workshops). In some countries these 
methods obtained more emphasis. For 
example, in Poland privatization through 
liquidation led to the actively controlled 
privatization method of several hundreds 
of companies. Employee buyouts may 
play an important role in Serbia, where 
this privatization method can be “sold” 
as a clear continuation of the strong col-
lective socialist ownership patterns. Ex-
periences with employee ownership in 
Hungary suggest, however, that this is in 
many cases an intermediate step of 
transferring property to strategic owners, 
or to insider privatization (i.e. manage-
ment buys out employee ownership). 
Lastly there is also the option of privati-
zation through the stock exchange but 
this method may not receive serious at-
tention on the Balkans, since capital 
markets of these countries are rather 
underdeveloped and there are only very 
few firms to qualify for public offering. 
3) PRIVATIZATION AND 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT         
ON THE BALKANS 
Foreign direct investment attraction de-
pends largely on privatization policies 
wherever there is still substantial state 
property in the region. Bulgarian privati-
zation has continued uninterrupted since 
1997, where almost 90% of the state 
property that was foreseen for privatiza-
tion has already been privatized. On the 
other hand one third of all state prop-
erty was kept in state management. This 
means nearly 600 companies, with ma-
jority state ownership in 63 companies. 
The main task of the coming years will 
be the reduction of state-ownership 
shares. This will affect mainly the elec-
tricity sector, travel, military industry 
and cultural institutions. The energy sec-
tor is under reconstruction according the 
EU norms. Production and servicing is 
separated into different companies. NEK 
(the energy supplier) and Bulgargas is 
expected to be privatized in 2007. The 
rather politicized privatization of Bul-
gartabac may also be completed earlier. 
A privatization sales campaign in the 
Romanian services sector is expected in 
the near future (regional energy and gas 
suppliers). Issues of bank privatization 
are also topical. AVAS privatized 62 lar-
ger and medium-sized firms in 2004, 
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but there are over 1500 companies in 
the agency’s portfolio. The accelerated 
privatization of these firms is expected 
shortly through the involvement of for-
eign investors.  
It is more difficult to foresee the fu-
ture speed and extent of privatization in 
Croatia. The Privatization Fund possesses 
1100 firms at present, one third in 
manufacturing, one third in services and 
tourism, and there are also over 100 
companies in the construction business. 
Previous privatization transactions did 
not prefer foreign participation. The new 
owners became the employees of the 
companies, the state pension fund, as 
well as citizens who received property in 
restitution. Bigger items are the HEP 
electricity supplier company, Osiguranje 
insurance company, as well as numerous 
firms in the heavy industry, including 
shipyards (many of them are heavily in-
debted). Similarly, much state-owned real 
estates (bound to tourism) could be sold. 
Currently it is not clear whether the 
Croatian government decides to open for 
foreign participation or continues the 
previous domestic-oriented practice. 
Serbian prospects are parallel with the 
Croatian experience largely due to the 
common heritage. Privatization was 
started here very late, only in 2003. Ac-
cording to the most current privatization 
plans 70% of state property is to be sold 
to strategic partners, and employees can 
buy out a further 15%. Especially impor-
tant could be privatization in the energy 
sector, in the chemical industry, food 
industry and in services. Foreign invest-
ments are needed also in the renovation 
of the badly damaged or destroyed lin-
ear infrastructure systems. Currently, 
state firms are prepared for later priva-
tization, but the sporadic concrete priva-
tization experiences in Serbia show 
rather limited level of commitment in 
favour of foreign investors. Most current 
negative example is the case of the Nis 
oil refinery, the majority ownership of 
which was sold to foreign investors. Af-
ter signing, the conditions of the contract 
were changed by the government reduc-
ing foreign ownership to a minority 
share. The foreign investor naturally 
withdrew from the deal. Important part 
of the preparations is clearing corporate-
asset portfolio from non-performing 
claims. The writing off of debts should 
limit payment arrears in the Serbian 
economy. 
Generally speaking, in the next future, 
the amounts of foreign direct investment 
will largely vary among the countries of 
the Balkans. One component of the po-
tential level is the size of available state 
property that can be privatized (also de-
pending on the quality of assets), the 
other is the willingness of governments 
to open up privatization process to for-
eign investors. The political will is deter-
mined by general political goals, and by 
the public perception of selling assets to 
foreign investors. In the new EU mem-
bers, as well as in those countries that 
will most probably join the Union in 
2007, quick and decisive privatization 
actions are expected because it is implic-
itly required in the process of taking 
over the aquis. In other countries, how-
ever, the process may be substantially 
slower and more controversial.  
From the viewpoint of the development 
and modernization of Balkan countries’ 
economies privatization and foreign in-
vestment may play a crucial role. From 
the angle of sustainable development and 
capital attraction, privatization invest-
ments, greenfield investments and the 
reinvestment of locally generated profits 
are regarded rather differently. The high 
peaks in the FDI records of certain 
countries are mainly attributed to one or 
a few major privatization deals. The pool 
of privatization is exhausted by time, 
thus, FDI attraction cannot be based on 
lucrative privatization offerings for ever. 
Substantial privatization opportunities still 
exist in the Balkan countries, but the 
sale of big business has been started in 
Romania and Bulgaria, reducing potential 
future stock. On the other hand, Croatia 
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and Serbia do not pursue FDI-friendly 
privatization policies.  
Comparing the composition of FDI 
stock, though there are big differences 
across countries and years, FDI stocks 
are still largely dominated by privatiza-
tion deals. Nonetheless, the yearly inflow 
figures sometimes show the priority of 
greenfield investments. In case of Bul-
garia one can observe the change of 
tendencies that the forerunner transition 
economies experienced 5-8 years ago. 
Greenfield investments together with rein-
vested profits and loan-financed expan-
sions of existing facilities contributed to 
some 70% of the capital stock in 2005. 
In Romania large privatization revenues 
(Petrom in 2004) limited the relative 
share of greenfield investments. But out 
of the 56 received investment applications 
in the first half of 2005 35 aimed 
greenfield projects or the expansion of 
capacities. On the other hand, in the ex-
Yugoslav countries (less Slovenia) no ma-
jor greenfield investment has been car-
ried out up until recently. Croatian 
sources state that some 20% of FDI in-
flow was greenfield investments, but they 
were mostly small-scale projects, employ-
ing less than 4% of manufacturing la-
bour. In the case of Serbia there are 
two major greenfield investments in the 
services sector.  
The sectoral penetration pattern of 
FDI in the Balkan countries is rather 
mixed. This heavily depends on pursued 
privatization policies. In most countries 
there have been strategic branches of the 
economy, or at least firms of strategic 
importance that should not be opened 
up to foreign investment (energy sector, 
banking sector, most of the communal 
services, some manufacturing branches). 
On the other hand, the structural com-
position of FDI also depends on the sec-
toral patterns of the host economies. 
There are, for example, large investment 
projects in tourism in Bulgaria and 
Croatia. The importance of structural 
patterns is evident if we compare Bul-
garia and Romania. Romanian FDI con-
centrates on manufacturing, meanwhile 
the share of manufacturing investments 
in Bulgaria is only 24%. It is telecom, 
trade and the energy sector which are 
more deeply penetrated in Bulgaria. 
Croatian FDI structure is more similar to 
the Bulgarian with the reservation that 
joint ventures (with minority foreign 
ownership) play an important role in 
Croatian FDI stock. The structure of the 
limited Serbian FDI stock, on the other 
hand, is similar to the Romanian. Out of 
the 15 largest privatization investments, 
10 were carried out in manufacturing.  
Beneficial effects of privatization and 
FDI can be illustrated by the structural 
changes of the economies. Following the 
1997 stabilization efforts FDI inflow in-
tensified in Bulgaria and resulted in ob-
servable structural change and increasing 
export performance. Romania still fights 
with rather serious structural problems 
that have to be solved before joining the 
European Union. Privatization may play 
an important role in this process. On the 
other hand, structural adjustment will 
also require the closure of many large 
state-owned companies thus increasing 
unemployment in several regions. With-
out the current intensive subsidization 
these companies cannot survive. Croatia 
and Serbia are not forced to eliminate 
direct subsidization of ailing state firms. 
Surviving state paternalism is coupled 
with a less FDI-friendly political environ-
ment. Hence, on the one side, the elimi-
nation of inefficient activities is not en-
forced, on the other, the creation of new 
structures by FDI is not supported. The 
outcome of long-term structural rigidity 
can be predicted. A clear sign of struc-
tural weakness is the 10,000 Croatian 
firms that are regarded illiquid. Payment 
arrears in the country achieve USD 2 
billion. In Serbia not even the pre-war 
levels of economic activity were achieved 
until recently. 
Even if we expect successful economic 
policies in these countries the current 
high level of unemployment will not be 
reduced substantially on the short run. 
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Due to belated privatization unemploy-
ment will most probably even increase. 
Most unemployed in these countries are 
unskilled, and they have therefore only 
limited chances to obtain jobs in interna-
tionally competitive sectors. The problem 
cannot be solved with ad hoc measures. 
Privatization contracts may set employ-
ment conditions, but on the longer run 
levels and structure of employment will 
be shaped according to the needs of the 
private owners. The short-term conse-
quences of maintaining excessive em-
ployment limits international competitive-
ness and reduces the chances for suc-
cessful restructuring. The problem is 
worse if domestic owners act and there 
is employee ownership. Foreign companies 
developed their practice how to over-
come employment conditions, shaping ex-
tent and structure of employment ac-
cording to their needs. If employment 
requirements are too strict foreign inves-
tors simply withdraw. 
Hungarian companies pursued differ-
ent strategies in their investments abroad. 
Some companies tried to buy majority 
ownership at once (e.g. OTP), others 
gradually increased their ownership 
share, also according to the availability 
of state assets. Such step-by-step ap-
proach is plausible in countries with
investment restrictions, for example in 
Croatia. Since investment restrictions are 
fully in contrast with EU regulations and 
principles, the elimination of them can be 
expected in all those countries that are 
serious in their aim of becoming mem-
bers. Hungarian investors invested the 
largest amounts, mainly in the privatiza-
tion process. Out of the 10 largest Hun-
garian outward FDI projects 9 were pri-
vatization related. More sizeable manu-
facturing investments, on the other hand, 
are shared between privatization and 
greenfield projects. Videoton purchased a 
factory in Bulgaria, meanwhile Pannon-
plast and Dunapack established new 
greenfield investments in Romania and 
Croatia, respectively. Most of the small 
investments belong to the greenfield 
category. In case of the small invest-
ments there are no ownership restrictions 
even if bigger investments or privatiza-
tion deals are strictly regulated and con-
trolled (Croatia, Serbia). Hungarian inves-
tors experienced problems mostly in 
Croatia (not in Serbia, because there are 
only a few Hungarian investments, yet). 
Most of them were related to property 
rights. The lack of clear rules and 
regulations of obtaining property is a 
major barrier of investment. 
 
* * * * * 
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THE RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
WITH THE BALKAN COUNTRIES* 
 
Tamás Szemlér 
INTRODUCTION 
For the European Union (EU), the politi-
cal and economic stability of the coun-
tries in its direct neighbourhood, as well 
as the calculable development of its re-
lations with these countries is of great 
importance. The development of the ex-
ternal relations of the EU in the last 
decade is characterised by the institu-
tionalisation and structuring of these 
relations.  
The above statements are especially 
valid for the countries of the Balkan 
peninsula. After the economic recession 
following the systemic change and, in 
the case of former Yugoslavia, the 
armed conflicts, the EU has become 
very interested in the stabilisation of the 
region. It has already been clear at the 
creation of the structured system of re-
lationships that the countries of the re-
gion differ from each other to a great 
extent regarding the level of their eco-
nomic development, political stability and 
democracy – all these aspects are cru-
cial from the EU point of view when it 
considers establishing closer institutional-
ised relations with a country.  
Due to this heterogeneity of the re-
gion, we find here countries which are 
already at the threshold of EU member-
ship (Bulgaria, Romania), a country 
which could already open the negotia-
tions on its accession (Croatia), while 
the other countries are much further 
from full EU membership, and are con-
nected to the EU by other contractual 
relations (or just work on formulating 
these ties).1 
This paper presents an overview of 
EU relations with the Balkan countries. 
In what follows, we deal separately with 
the countries having already concluded 
their accession negotiations (Bulgaria 
and Romania) and the other countries. 
(These latter have the common feature 
of participating in the Stabilisation and 
Association Process (SAP) for the West-
ern Balkans. Besides the bilateral rela-
tions with the EU – but definitely not 
                         
1 Slovenia, a former Yugoslav Republic is an EU 
member since 2004. Thus it is much more ad-
vanced in this respect (among other respects) 
than the countries observed here. In this paper 
we do not examine the EU-Slovenian relations. 
 
* This paper has been prepared in the frame-
work of the OTKA research No. 038289, “The 
European Union and Its Direct Neighbourhood 
beyond Enlargement”. 
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independently from them – we also dis-
cuss the actual situation and future 
prospects of regional cooperation. 
1) THE COUNTRIES AT THE 
THRESHOLD OF EU 
MEMBERSHIP 
The leaders of two of the Balkan coun-
tries – Bulgaria and Romania – have 
already signed the treaty on EU acces-
sion. The expected date of the entry of 
these countries into the EU is 1 January 
2007, but this date can be postponed 
in both cases if the EU finds that the 
country does not comply wholly with EU 
requirements regarding the preparation 
for membership and related reforms. 
Despite the fact that Romania has 
made steps in bilateral relations the ear-
liest – it was the first country of the 
Soviet bloc establishing official relations 
with the European Communities –, at 
the beginning of the 2000s, both coun-
tries were on the same track regarding 
their EU relations (Table 1). 
The EU has provided financial sup-
port for the social and economic devel-
opment of the two countries (a pre-
condition of tightening the relations). 
Until 2002, Bulgaria has received about 
1.35 bn euros of support in the frame-
work of the PHARE Programme; the 
framework for 2003 was 94.9 million 
euros for national programmes, and 28 
million euros for cross-border coopera-
tion; for 2004, respectively, 172.5 mil-
lion euros and 36 million euros were 
available for Bulgaria from PHARE re-
sources. Concerning the two newer pre-
accession funds (ISPA and SAPARD, 
both are in operation since 2000), Bul-
garia has received about 463 million 
euros ISPA and 287 million euros 
SAPARD support until 2004. Romania – 
 
 
Table1 
The relations of Bulgaria and Romania with 
the EU – the main steps 
 
Year Bulgaria Romania 
1974 
 Romania’s inclusion 
in the Community's 
Generalised System 
of Preferences  
1980 
 Signing of the 
Agreement on In-
dustrial Products  
1990
Bulgaria and the 
European Eco-
nomic Community 
signed the Agree-
ment on Trade 
and Cooperation; 
the PHARE Pro-
gramme was 
opened to Bulgaria 
 
1991 
 Signing of the 
Trade and Co-
operation Agree-
ment; the PHARE 
Programme was 
opened to Romania
1993 
March: the Europe 
Agreement for 
Bulgaria and the 
Interim Agreement 
on Trade and Re-
lated Matters were 
signed  
February: the 
Europe Agreement 
for Romania and 
the Interim 
Agreement on 
Trade and Related 
Matters were 
signed  
1995
February: entrance 
into force of the 
Europe Agreement 
December: applica-
tion for EU mem-
bership 
February: entrance 
into force of the 
Europe Agreement 
June: application 
for EU membership 
 
1999
December: Helsinki European Council's 
decision to open the accession negotia-
tions  
2000 February: formal beginning of the ac-cession negotiations  
2004 December: closure of the accession ne-gotiations  
2005 April: signing of the Accession Treaty in Luxembourg  
2007
January 1 – planned accession date; 
delay by 1 year is possible if prepara-
tions are not continued 
Source: European Commission 
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due to its considerably bigger size (es-
pecially concerning population) has re-
ceived much more substantial financial 
support than Bulgaria: the total amount 
of EU transfers to Romania in the 
framework of the three above pro-
grammes until 2004 exceeded 4.8 bn 
euros. Support for 2004 exceeded 900 
million euros (from the total amount of 
908 million euros, 433.3 mn euros be-
longed to PHARE [from this, 405.3 mil-
lion euros for national programmes, 28 
million euros for cross-border coopera-
tion], 158.7 million euros to SAPARD, 
and 316 million euros to ISPA).2 
EU support assures important finan-
cial resources for both countries: in the 
period 2004–2006, each year, this sup-
port equals to about 2% of GDP in 
Bulgaria, and 1.5% of GDP in Romania. 
After accession, EU financial support for 
both countries is expected to show a 
considerable (although partly gradual) 
increase. 
2) THE COUNTRIES OF THE 
STABILISATION AND 
ACCESSION PROCESS 
The SAP is the framework programme 
of the EU for Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Re-
public of Macedonia and Serbia-
Montenegro including Kosovo as defined 
by the UNSCR 1244. Although Croatia 
has begun its accession negotiations with 
the EU in October 2005, it also partici-
pates in the process. This is in line with 
the important principle that the SAP is 
the policy of the EU towards the coun-
tries of the Western Balkans throughout 
                         
2 Source of data: 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/bulg
aria/eu_relations.htm, 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/rom
ania/eu_relations.htm. 
the whole process of their full integra-
tion into the Union. 
The SAP is a long-term process, pro-
viding a general framework for the 
countries of the region for their rela-
tionship with the EU, and at the same 
time it takes into account the differ-
ences in political and economic devel-
opment between them (both the general 
framework and the differences can be 
followed in Table 2). By launching the 
SAP, the objective of the EU is to as-
sure the conditions of peace, political 
stability, freedom and economic devel-
opment in the region. In order to reach 
these objectives, the EU proposed the 
countries of the region the prospect of 
full membership; the most important 
milestone on the road leading to this 
objective is the Stabilisation and Associa-
tion Agreement (SAA) for each country. 
For the SAP countries, the EU pro-
vides “country-shaped” combinations of 
trade concessions (Autonomous Trade 
Preferences), economic and financial 
support (the CARDS programme; see 
Table 3), and contractual relations. Be-
sides bilateral relations, the encourage-
ment and support of regional coopera-
tion is also an important element of the 
structure of relations in the framework 
of the SAP. 
The SAP launched in 2000 (at the 
EU–Balkans summit held in Zagreb) has 
received new impetus at the Thessaloniki 
European Council in 2003, which, by 
approving the “Thessaloniki Agenda”, 
reinforced the SAP as the policy of the 
EU towards the Western Balkans, and 
confirmed the EU integration prospects 
of the SAP countries, as well (the coun-
tries participating in the process can 
join the EU, once they will be ready for 
it). 
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Table 2 
The relations of the countries of the Western Balkans with the EU – the main steps 
 
Year Albania Bosnia-Herzegovina Croatia Macedonia-FYROM Serbia-Montenegro 
1992 
Trade and Cooperation Agree-
ment between the EU and Alba-
nia. Albania becomes eligible for 
funding under the EU PHARE 
Programme 
April: Bosnia-Herzegovina de-
clares independence – the civil 
war starts 
   
1995 
 November: the Dayton Peace 
Agreement puts an end to the 
war 
   
1996 
   The former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia becomes eligible for 
funding under the EC PHARE 
programme 
 
1997 Regional Approach. The EU Council of Ministers establishes political and economic conditionality for the development of bilateral relations 
1997 
   April: Signature of a Cooperation 
Agreement and financial protocol 
to promote global co-operation; 
Agreement on Trade in Textile 
Products; Agreement in the field 
of Transport 
 
1998 
 June: EU/Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Consultative Task Force is estab-
lished 
 The Cooperation Agreement and 
the Agreement in the field of 
Transport enter into force 
 
1999 The EU proposes the new Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) for five countries of South-Eastern Europe 
1999 
Albania benefits from Autono-
mous Trade Preferences with the 
EU 
    
2000 
June: Feira European Council (June 2000) states that all the SAP countries are "potential candidates" for EU membership 
November: At Zagreb Summit, the SAP is officially endorsed by the EU and the Western Balkan countries 
2000 
Extension of duty-free access to 
EU market for products from 
Albania 
   October: Fall of the Milosevic 
regime. November: “Framework 
Agreement FRY (Former Republic 
of Yugoslavia)-EU for the provi-
sion of Assistance and Support 
by the EU to the FRY”. Serbia 
and Montenegro benefits from 
Autonomous Trade Preferences 
from the EU 
  
24 
Year Albania Bosnia-Herzegovina Croatia Macedonia-FYROM Serbia-Montenegro 
2001 First year of the new CARDS programme specifically designed for the SAP countries 
2001 
The Commission recommends the 
undertaking of negotiations on 
SAA with Albania 
 29 October: Signature of the 
Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement (SAA) 
 
9 April: Signature of the Stabili-
sation and Association Agreement 
(SAA) 
1 June: Entry into force of the 
Interim Agreement (covered the 
trade and trade-related parts of 
the SAA 
July: The Council adopts a Joint 
Action on an EU Special Repre-
sentative 
August: Signature of the Frame-
work Agreement in Ohrid 
July: Start of the EU-FRY Consul-
tative Task Force 
2002 
October: Negotiating Directives 
for the negotiation of a SAA 
with Albania are adopted 
March: Joint Actions are adopted 
for the appointment of an EU 
Special Representative (EUSR) and 
the launching of the EU Police 
Mission (EUPM) 
  March: Signature of the Belgrade 
Agreement on a restructured 
State Union 
2003 June: At Thessaloniki Summit (June), the SAP is confirmed as the EU policy for the Western Balkans. The EU perspective for these countries is confirmed (countries participat-ing in the SAP are eligible for EU accession and may join the EU once they are ready) 
2003 
31 January: Commission President 
Prodi officially launches the ne-
gotiations for a SAA between the 
EU and Albania. These negotia-
tions are presently ongoing. 
 
November: The Commission pro-
duces a Feasibility Study assess-
ing Bosnia-Herzegovina’s capacity 
to implement a future Stabilisa-
tion and Association Agreement. 
The study concludes that nego-
tiations should start once Bosnia-
Herzegovina has addressed 16 
key priorities 
February: Croatia applies for EU 
membership 
 February: Entry into force of the 
Constitutional Charter 
July: Enhanced Permanent Dia-
logue replaced the format of the 
Consultative Task Force 
2004 
June: Council decision on the 
principles of a European Part-
nership for Albania 
June: : EU decides on a Euro-
pean Partnership for Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
December: EUFOR replaces SFOR 
(“Althea” operation) 
April: European Commission is-
sues positive opinion on Croatia’s 
application for EU membership 
application 
June: European Council confirms 
Croatia as candidate country 
December: European Council sets 
17 March 2005 as start date 
for negotiations conditional upon 
full cooperation with the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia 
22 March: Application for EU 
membership 
1 April: Entry into force of the 
SAA 
17 May: EU Council requests the 
Commission to prepare an Opin-
ion on the application 
14 June: Council decision on the 
European Partnership for the 
former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia 
14 September: First meeting of 
June: Council decision on the 
European Partnership for Serbia 
and Montenegro 
October: Council conclusions on 
the twin-track approach 
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Year Albania Bosnia-Herzegovina Croatia Macedonia-FYROM Serbia-Montenegro 
the Stabilisation and Association 
Council between the EU and the 
former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia 
1 October: Hand over of the 
Commission’s questionnaire on 
the preparation of the EC Opin-
ion 
2005 
December: Council decision on 
the principles of a revised Euro-
pean Partnership for Albania 
October: Following significant 
progress by Bosnia-Herzegovina 
in addressing the 16 key priori-
ties identified by the 2003 Feasi-
bility Study, the Commission rec-
ommends the opening of negotia-
tions for a Stabilisation and As-
sociation Agreement and submits 
draft negotiating directives to the 
Council 
November: The Council adopts 
the negotiating directives for the 
negotiation of a Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement (SAA) 
with Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
authorises the Commission to 
open negotiations. Negotiations 
are officially opened in Sarajevo 
on 25 November 
1 February: Stabilisation and As-
sociation Agreement enters into 
force 
16 March: EU postpones start of 
accession negotiations but adopts 
framework for negotiations with 
Croatia 
26 April : First meeting of Stabi-
lisation and Association Council; 
meeting of extended “EU troika” 
on Croatia’s cooperation with the 
International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia 
3 October 3.: Start of accession 
negotiations 
14 February: Hand over by the 
Government of the replies to the 
EC questionnaire to the Commis-
sion 
16 December: At the European 
Council, Macedonia gets candi-
date status 
April: The Commission adopts a 
Feasibility Report which con-
cluded that Serbia and Montene-
gro is prepared to negotiate a 
Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement with the EU 
2006 
18 February: Signature of the 
Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement (SAA) 
    
Source: European Commission 
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Table 3 
CARDS programme allocation for 2000–2006 
(million euros) 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
Albania 33.4 37.5 44.9 46.5 63.5 44.2 45.5 315.5 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 90.3 105.2 71.9 63.0 72.0 49.4 51.0 502.8 
Croatia (transfer to pre-accession from 2005) 16.8 60.0 59.0 62.0 81.0 - - 278.8 
Macedonia (FYROM) 13.0 56.2 41.5 43.5 59.0 45.0 40.0 298.2 
Serbia and Montenegroa 650.5 385.5 351.6 324.3 307.9 282.5 245.5 2547.8 
Interim Civilian Administrations 10.0 24.5 33.0 32.0 35.0 36.0 35.0 205.5 
Regional 20.2 20.0 43.5 31.5 23.0 47.9 42.0 228.1 
Otherb 141.5 118.0 11.0 17.0 22.5 19.7 19.8 349.5 
Macro-Financial Assistance (grants)c 70.0 120.0 100.0 15.0 16.0 33.0 50.0 404.0 
Total 1045.7 926.9 756.4 634.8 679.9 557.7 528.8 5130.2 
Croatia pre-accession 2005–2006      105.0 140.0 245.0 
Total (including Croatia 2005–2006)      662.7 668.8 5375.2 
General remarks:  
* Figures for the year 2006 are purely indicative and correspond to the multiannual indicative programming (MIP); 
* Figures include assistance from PHARE and Obnova where relevant in 2000, and from CARDS 2001 and onwards; 
* 2005 budget implementation. Re-use of recoveries from 2004/5, i.e. above budget allocation 2005: 6 million euros for Macedonia (FYROM), 7.5 million euros for 
regional programme. 
a) Includes the Republic of Serbia, the Republic of Montenegro and the province Kosovo, which is currently under UN administration. Amounts for Serbia in 2002–
2003 include assistance from Regional Programme for Integrated Border Management destined for the whole of FRY/Serbia and Montenegro. In 2004, 8 million 
euros for that purpose is shown under the regional programme. 
b) Until 2001 (incl.): Humanitarian aid, Specific Measures, Rapid Intervention Operations, EIDHR and GFSP;  From 2002 (incl.): Administrative costs and the Western 
Balkans’ contribution to the European Training Foundation. 
c) For 2000–2002: disbursements and not commitments. 
 
Source: European Commission (http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/cards/financial_en.htm)  
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Table 4 
Free trade agreements in Southeastern Europe 
(as of 9 June 2005) 
 
 Albania Bosnia-Herzegovina Bulgaria Croatia Macedonia Moldova
1) Romania Serbia-Montenegro2) UNMIK/Kosovo
3) 
Albania   
 Applied: 
01/12/04 
WTO4) 
Applied: 
01/09/03 WTO 
Applied: 
01/06/03 WTO 
Applied: 
15/07/02 WTO 
Applied: 
01/11/04 WTO 
Applied: 
01/01/04 WTO 
Applied: 
01/08/04 WTO 
Applied: 
01/10/03 WTO  
Bosnia- Herzego-
vina 
 Applied: 
01/12/04 WTO    
 Applied: 
01/12/04 WTO 
Applied: 
01/01/05 WTO 
Applied: 
01/07/02 WTO 
Applied: 
01/05/04 WTO 
Applied: 
01/12/04 WTO 
Applied: 
01/06/02  
II round FTA 
negotiations: 
2005 II. n.év 
Bulgaria 
Applied: 
01/09/03 WTO  
 Applied: 
01/12/04 WTO   
CEFTA 01/03/03 
WTO  
Applied: 
01/01/00 WTO 
Applied: 
01/11/04 WTO 
CEFTA 
01/07/97 WTO 
Applied: 
1/06/2004 
WTO  
Under examina-
tion 
Croatia 
Applied: 
01/06/03 WTO  
 Applied: 
01/01/05 WTO 
CEFTA 
1/03/2003 
WTO  
  
Applied: 
11/06/97 Re-
vised: 11/06/02 
Applied: 
1/07/02  WTO 
Applied: 
01/10/04 WTO 
CEFTA 01/03/03 
WTO  
Applied: 
01/07/04    
 Macedonia 
(FYROM) 
Applied: 
15/07/02 WTO  
Applied: 
01/07/02 WTO 
Applied: 
01/01/00 WTO 
Applied: 
11/06/97    
Revised: 
11/06/02    
Applied: 
11/07/02 WTO 
  
Applied: 
01/01/05 WTO 
Applied: 
01/01/04 WTO 
Initialised: 
31/05/05 
IV round FTA 
negotiations: 
08/06/05 
Moldova1) 
Applied: 
01/11/04 WTO  
Applied: 
01/05/04  
WTO  
Applied: 
01/11/04 WTO 
Applied: 
01/10/04 WTO 
Applied: 
01/01/05 WTO   
Applied: 
17/11/94 WTO 
Applied: 
01/09/04  
WTO  
  
Romania Applied: 01/01/04 WTO  
 Applied: 
01/12/04 WTO 
CEFTA 
01/07/97 WTO 
CEFTA 01/03/03 
WTO  
Applied: 
01/01/04 WTO 
Applied: 
17/11/94 WTO   
 Applied: 
01/07/04 WTO 
Under prelimi-
nary analysis 
Serbia-
Montenegro2) 
Applied: 
01/08/04 WTO  
Applied: 
01/06/02  
Applied: 
01/06/2004 
WTO  
Applied: 
01/07/04  
Initialised: 
31/05/05 
Applied: 
01/09/04 WTO 
 Applied: 
01/07/04 WTO     
Kosovo3) Applied: 01/10/03 WTO  
II round FTA 
negotiations: 
2005 II. n.év  
Under examina-
tion   
IV round FTA 
negotiations: 
08/06/05 
  Under prelimi-nary analysis     
1) Moldova is associated to the process with and extended timeline; 2) Serbia & Montenegro started negotiation process when it was known as FR Yugoslavia; there-
fore, both names may appear on the agreements; 3) All agreements in line with UNSCR 1244; 4) FTA notified to WTO 
Source: http://www.stabilitypact.org/trade/FTA%20Matrix%20_9%20June%202005.xls 
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Making trade relations easier – both 
vis-à-vis the EU and between the coun-
tries of the region – is an important 
element of SAP. Trade with the EU is 
encouraged by trade concessions pro-
vided by the Union (since 2000, 95% of 
the exports of the five SAP countries to 
the EU are exempt from any customs 
duties and quantity restrictions), while 
intra-regional trade is to be supported 
by a series of bilateral free-trade agree-
ments (involving the five SAP countries, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova (as an asso-
ciated partner), and Kosovo (treated 
separately from Serbia and Montenegro 
in this respect). The matrix of the South-
east European bilateral free-trade agree-
ments (Table 4) is expected to be com-
pleted soon, and they are planned to be 
transformed into a multilateral free trade 
agreement in 2007. 
Trade data of the region (Tables 5–8) 
show that there has been progress 
achieved in intra-regional trade between 
2000 and 2004. However, the quite of-
ten low weights (in absolute terms, gen-
erally still modest) of external trade 
among each other, and the trade deficits 
(reflecting in many cases the lack of ex-
port products) of the countries show 
clearly that these countries face consid-
erable economic difficulties (and in some 
cases, their performance is highly de-
pendent on external – principally EU – 
aid and financial assistance). It is impor-
tant to note that – partly due to the 
specific features of the region – the 
share of trade with the EU within the 
total trade of these countries does not 
give us any reason to draw general con-
clusions. (The highest share of EU trade 
in the region – exceeding even the Hun-
garian figures – is registered in the case 
of Albania.) 
The trends reflected in the data of 
Tables 5–8 are – despite the difficulties 
– positive: the trade potential of the re-
gion is slowly but continuously increas-
ing. The weight of the SEE-7 in EU ex-
ports increased from 0.9% in 2000 to 
1.4% in 2004. In Hungarian exports, the 
SEE-7 increased their share from 4% in 
2000 to 6.5% in 2004. This tendency – 
despite the quite uneven distribution due 
to different factors – is promising, and 
is expected to be continued if the region 
can continue its peaceful development. 
 
 
Table 5 
Southeast European (SEE 7) trade with the EU and Hungary: exports (% of total), 2000 
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Albania - 0 0.5 - 1.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Bosnia-Herzegovina - - 0.2 10.6 1.7 0.1 14.7 0.0 0.7 
Bulgaria 0.0 0.0 - 0.1 1.8 1.8 1.2 0.1 0.2 
Croatia 0.1 7.2 0.1 - 3.7 0.2 - 0.2 0.6 
Macedonia 1.9 1.0 2.3 1.3 - 0.1 12.2 0.1 0.1 
Romania 0.0 0.7 1.8 0.1 0.2 - - 0.4 2.0
Yugoslavia - 21.6 7.8 - 22.2 - - 0.1 0.3 
SEE 7 2.1 30.5 12.6 12.0 30.9 2.3 28.2 0.9 4.0
European Union 93.4 47.6 51.2 50.5 46.1 60.6 37.7 - 70.0
Hungary 0.0 0.3 0.6 1.3 0.3 3.0 3.6 1.2 - 
Total (bn USD) 0.3 1.0 4.8 4.4 1.3 10.4 1.7 2240.7 26.9 
Source: WIIW, http://www.wiiw.ac.at/balkan/files/data/export_SEE_2000 
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Table 6 
Southeast European (SEE 7) trade with the EU and Hungary: imports (% of total), 2000 
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Albania - - 0.0 - 0.2 - 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 0.0 - 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.1 4.7 0.0 0.0 
Bulgaria 2.5 0.3 - 0.1 5.7 0.6 8.7 0.1 0.1 
Croatia 1.0 14.4 0.1 - 3.0 0.0 - 0.1 0.2 
Macedonia 1.9 0.7 0.4 0.7 - 0.0 3.5 0.0 0.0 
Romania 0.7 0.4 3.5 0.2 0.5 - 3.9 0.3 0.8 
Yugoslavia - 5.7 0.4 - 10.0 - - 0.0 0.0 
SEE 7 6.1 21.4 4.4 2.0 19.8 0.7 20.9 0.5 1.1 
European Union 75.6 33.2 44.0 54.3 49.4 63.0 40.9 - 66.4 
Hungary 0.9 5.7 0.9 2.3 1.1 3.6 3.3 0.9 - 
Total (bn USD) 1.1 3.6 6.5 7.9 2.1 12.1 3.7 2328.3 34.2 
Source: WIIW, http://www.wiiw.ac.at/balkan/files/data/import_SEE_2000, Eurostat COMEXT 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 
Southeast European (SEE 7) trade with the EU and Hungary: exports (% of total), 2004 
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Albania - 0.1 0.4 0.3 1.2 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 0.0 - 0.1 14.1 1.9 0.1 17.7 0.1 0.5 
Bulgaria 0.0 0.1 - 0.3 1.8 1.7 1.2 0.2 0.5 
Croatia 0.1 18.5 0.5 - 6.8 0.8 4.2 0.3 1.3 
Macedonia 0.8 0.4 2.2 0.9 - 0.1 7.2 0.0 0.1 
Romania 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.7 0.2 - 1.0 0.6 3.2 
Serbia-Montenegro 2.6 16.2 3.6 3.6 31.6 0.9 - 0.1 0.9 
SEE 7 3.6 35.2 10.1 20.1 43.6 3.6 31.7 1.4 6.5 
European Union 84.5 60.0 57.0 62.6 44.6 71.0 51.6 - 78.6 
Hungary 0.0 4.1 0.9 1.3 0.2 3.7 3.2 1.1 - 
Total (bn USD) 0.5 1.8 9.1 8.1 1.5 22.3 3.4 3641.3 55.3 
Source: WIIW, http://www.wiiw.ac.at/balkan/files/data/export_dot_see_2004 
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Table 8 
Southeast European (SEE 7) trade with the EU and Hungary: imports (% of total), 2004 
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Albania - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 0.1 - 0.0 2.1 0.3 0.0 2.9 0.0 0.1 
Bulgaria 2.3 0.3 - 0.3 8.7 0.9 3.6 0.2 0.2 
Croatia 1.3 22.7 0.2 - 3.2 0.2 3.0 0.1 0.2 
Macedonia 0.9 0.6 0.2 0.7 - 0.0 3.5 0.0 0.0 
Romania 0.9 0.5 2.4 1.2 0.7 - 2.2 0.5 1.5 
Serbia-Montenegro 0.6 10.9 0.3 0.8 11.2 0.1 - 0.1 0.2 
SEE 7 6.1 34.9 3.2 5.2 24.2 1.2 15.4 0.9 2.2 
European Union 72.5 59.7 59.4 69.6 59.5 72.0 56.3 - 71.4 
Hungary 0.9 5.4 2.2 3.2 3.1 5.8 5.1 1.1 - 
Total (bn USD) 2.3 5.5 13.9 16.6 2.5 33.2 9.9 3680.8 59.6 
Source: WIIW, http://www.wiiw.ac.at/balkan/files/data/import_dot_see_2004 
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HUNGARY AS AN EXPORTER OF CAPITAL* 
András Inotai 
For almost one and a half decades, one 
of the many aspects in which Hungary 
has produced an outstanding perform-
ance compared to other countries in the 
region was that it managed to attract 
the most international capital per head. 
According to UN figures, as of the end 
of 2004 the stock of foreign direct in-
vestment in Hungary exceeded USD 60 
billion. This was practically on a par 
with the USD 61 billion invested in Po-
land, a country four times as big as 
Hungary, and exceeded the foreign capi-
tal stock registered by the Czech Repub-
lic by almost 10% (56 billion USD). It 
was 10% short of the figure registered 
by Austria.1 
There are significant differences in the 
structural features of foreign capital. 
Foreign trade and corporate figures both 
demonstrate that foreign investments op-
erating in Hungary produce at a higher 
technological level, with increasingly sig-
nificant domestic added value. Unlike 
some countries in the region, investors 
did not decide to establish a base in 
Hungary purely with a view to the do-
mestic market. It was part of the global 
or European strategy of international 
                         
 
 
 
 
 
1 UNCTAD. World Investment Report 2004. New 
York, 2005. 
corporations, in order to organically in-
corporate the Hungarian production base 
into their transnational networks. Owing 
to an early start, Hungary was the first 
country in the region where foreign 
capital was able to recoup investment 
costs and make a profit. It shows the 
owners’ enduring trust that the over-
whelming majority of this profit is re-
invested into the Hungarian economy. It 
will take a few more years for the 
economies of most countries in the re-
gion to reach this stage. 
Over recent years, the majority of in-
ternational capital has started to grow 
into the Hungarian economy “organi-
cally,” which is reflected by the expan-
sion of supplier networks. This is due 
partly to favourable environmental condi-
tions, partly to EU membership. This 
makes a presence in the Hungarian pro-
duction and sales markets attractive for 
more and more small and medium-sized 
foreign enterprises. However, we cannot 
deny the effect of spontaneous devel-
opment, either. As a result of bilateral 
learning over a decade, some of the 
community of potential Hungarian pro-
ducers managed to upgrade to the re-
quirements of transnational corporations 
in terms of quality, technology, finance, 
volume of production. Meanwhile, inter-
national corporations realized that in 
several areas, they are able to cooperate 
with competitive Hungarian partners. 
There is considerable regional competi-
tion for international capital, with par-
* This study is based on a document prepared 
for the Ministry of Economy and Transport deal-
ing with the environmental conditions and future 
capital export opportunities of Hungary, through 
the analysis of seven selected countries (Bulgaria,
Croatia, Poland, Romania, Serbia-Montenegro, Slo-
vakia and Ukraine). 
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ticular foreign corporations deciding on 
where to set up a site and neighbouring 
countries sometimes succeeding in at-
tracting the capital. However, so far 
much of this success has been only su-
perficial. 
In the meantime, little attention has 
been paid to the other side of capital 
flow, namely the development of capital 
export of the individual countries. 
This issue never was on the agenda in 
the region in the first decade of the sys-
tem changes. The financial resources and 
energies of economic policy were tied up 
in managing and overcoming the trans-
formation, launching convergence with 
West European standards, and the reor-
ganization and revival of companies. 
However, a new stage is evolving. While 
capital import remains dominant, capital 
export has come into the picture, pri-
marily through the representation of cer-
tain Hungarian “regional corporations.” 
Once again, Hungary is taking the lead. 
According to our calculations, Hun-
garian capital invested abroad exceeds 
USD 6 billion. That is as much as one-
tenth of foreign direct investments in 
Hungary. 
1) PREMATURE CAPITAL 
EXPORT? 
International experience suggests that in 
a period of fast growth and successful 
convergence, the economic modernization 
of a country requires the involvement of 
significant external resources. These can 
be financed by direct investments, inter-
national loans and sometimes non-
refundable external resources, such as 
EU funds. 
Meaningful capital export usually 
emerges at a higher level of develop-
ment. That is unless we are talking 
about escape of capital, such as has 
happened for decades in Latin America, 
or the transfer of high and easily-earned 
profits at home, as found in the case of 
oil producing and exporting countries. 
Looking at several macroeconomic de-
velopment indicators, Hungary has not 
reached the level necessary for mean-
ingful export of capital. Therefore, early 
capital export requires the involvement 
of more external resources than would 
be necessary otherwise. The capital out-
flow has to be replaced, to keep the 
current account in balance and sustain a 
manageable external public debt. 
Still, there is a case for premature 
capital export. 
Unlike former experiences in the 
world economy, in today's international 
economy capital flows and competes 
practically without restrictions. Everybody 
is affected, whether they want to partici-
pate in this competition or not. 
Moreover, other Central and East 
European countries launched comprehen-
sive privatisation strategies in recent 
years, or are about to launch such pro-
grams. This opens opportunities for 
Hungarian companies for acquisition of 
companies and markets. These must be 
captured now, not in a decade, when 
the macroeconomic situation of the cap-
ital-exporting country might offer better 
conditions. 
It is also true that the strong regional 
activity of Hungarian enterprises is in-
separable from the economic and mental 
reforms that were launched decades ear-
lier, and have created a more developed 
microeconomic environment in Hungary 
compared to neighbouring countries. The 
hidden benefits of that are reflected in 
the remarkable activity of Hungarian 
capital. 
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2) FACTS AND FIGURES 
It is impossible to accurately determine 
the stock of Hungarian capital invested 
abroad. Statistics from the National Bank 
of Hungary published in the current ac-
count do not contain minor investments. 
However, in more than one 
neighbouring country, there are hun-
dreds or thousands of such firms oper-
ating. These are particularly to be found 
in areas with an ethnic Hungarian popu-
lation, such as the Székelyföld in Roma-
nia. 
In addition, re-investment of profits 
deriving from earlier investments will in-
crease the capital stock. So will invest-
ments oriented toward expansion and 
development that are not financed by 
capital export from Hungary, but by 
other means, such as loans borrowed in 
the host country or on the international 
market. 
Differences in the “mirror statistics” 
may be as high as several hundred mil-
lion euros. Ukrainian figures show a 
much higher Hungarian capital portfolio 
than the corresponding Hungarian fig-
ures. The situation is the opposite in the 
case of Romania. 
The available figures include transac-
tions executed not by Hungarian compa-
nies, but by foreign companies located in 
Hungary. A case in point is the invest-
ment of Magyar Telekom – called Matáv 
at the time – in Macedonia, or, most 
recently, in Montenegro. This was fi-
nanced from profit of the foreign parent 
company, earned in Hungary. 
Without going into detailed debates 
regarding the volume of exported capi-
tal, a comparison of various Hungarian 
and international sources suggests that 
the portfolio of Hungarian capital 
abroad reaches USD 6 billion. Some 
claim it is as high as EUR 6 billion. 
This figure exceeds the indicators of 
every other Central East European coun-
try that underwent system changes. The 
UN document referred to above mentions 
a Hungarian portfolio of USD 4.5 billion, 
based on data as of the end of 2004, 
as opposed to the Polish portfolio of 
USD 3 billion, the Czech one of USD 2.7 
billion, or the USD 2.5 billion figure for 
Slovenia. 
Hungary’s leading position is particu-
larly remarkable since the Czech Repub-
lic – despite the disintegration of Czecho-
slovakia – still has an obvious destination 
for capital in Slovakia, while Poland has 
a traditional investment “homeland” in 
CIS countries, primarily Ukraine, and 
Slovenia has the states of former Yugo-
slavia. 
Hungarian capital export is very terri-
torially concentrated. About 80-85% of 
the portfolio has been invested in the 
immediate region. The first stage of capi-
tal export of every country involves ac-
quiring neighbouring markets. 
Perhaps the best example is Austria, 
which became a leading capital exporter 
of the region in the 15 years following 
the political and economic changes. Its 
capital exports in Central-East and 
Southeast Europe are much more signifi-
cant than the country's economic weight. 
Slovakia is the country that has re-
ceived the highest stock of Hungarian 
capital (USD 1.56 billion), followed by 
Romania (USD 1.02 billion) and Croatia 
(USD 936 million). The portfolio in Bul-
garia and Macedonia also is significant.2 
Hungarian capital plays the most sig-
nificant role in the economy of Mace-
donia, having a share of one-third in the 
entire foreign investment stock of this 
                         
2 In Hungarian capital export outside the region, 
the Netherlands takes the lead, while the portfolio 
of Hungarian capital is lower in Germany, Aus-
tria and overseas. 
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Balkan state. That comes from Magyar 
Telekom’s investment alone. 
In other countries, the portfolio of 
Hungarian capital is made up of several 
large investments and many minor enter-
prises. In Slovakia, within the entire for-
eign direct investment portfolio, the 
Hungarian ratio is over 10%. The ratio 
is a significant 5-7% in Croatia, Bulgaria, 
Romania and Serbia-Montenegro. (See 
Table 1) 
As for the sectors in which the Hun-
garian investments happen, in certain 
countries the service sector is predomi-
nent. That includes not only Magyar 
Telekom, but also the oil firm MOL and 
OTP Bank, as well as the real estate in-
vestments of TriGránit. In other coun-
tries, with far more modest capital 
amounts, Hungarian investments are 
predominantly in the processing industry, 
including food, pharmaceuticals, pack-
aging and electronic parts. Hungarian 
interests are strongly service-oriented in 
Macedonia and Montenegro, where 
Magyar Telekom plays a determining 
role, and also in Slovakia. Services are 
significantly over-represented within in-
vestments in Romania, Croatia and Bul-
garia, though these countries also have 
significant processing industry investments 
from Hungary. On the Polish market, the 
weight of industrial investments is higher, 
apart from TriGránit’s construction pro-
jects. 
In terms of investment type, Hungar-
ian corporations typically become in-
volved in privatisation. Apart from Tri-
Gránit’s projects, all major Hungarian 
purchases between 2000 and 2005 were 
associated with privatisation and can be 
traced back to the activities of the three 
Hungarian “regional multinationals” (Ta-
ble 2). In some of these, Hungarian cor-
porations acquired full ownership at the 
moment of the purchase, in other cases 
they acquired minority or majority 
Table 1
The stock of Hungarian direct investments in Central and 
Southeast European countries compared to all foreign direct investments 
(data as of 2004) 
 
Target country Stock of foreign capital (million USD) 
Hungarian capital stock 
(million USD)(a) 
Share of Hungarian   
capital stock (%) 
Slovakia 14501 1 560 10.8 
Croatia 12989 936 7.2 
Bulgaria 7569 480 6.3 
Romania 18009 1020 5.7 
Serbia and Montenegro 3947 180 4.6 
Ukraine 9217 130 1.4 
Poland 61427 180(b) 0.3 
For comparison:    
Albania 1514 0(c,d) 0(c.d) 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1660 0(c,d) 0(c.d) 
Macedonia 1175 384(e) 32.7 
Czech Republic 56415 10(e) 1.8 
Slovenia 4962 20(c) 0.4 
Austria 62657 52(b) 0.08 
Notes: (a) Figures provided by the Ministry of Economy and Transport, conversed into dollars at an ex-
change rate of HUF 250/euro; (b) Does not include the value of the TriGránit capital investment now in 
progress; (c) Based on the 2003 year-end figures of KSH, converted from HUF to euro at a rate of HUF 
240/euro; (d) The figures of KSH at the end of 2003 imply minimal levels of Hungarian capital, HUF 34 
million in Bosnia and HUF 15 million in Albania; (e) Figures of the German-Hungarian Industry and Trade 
Chamber (DUIHK), converted into dollars at an exchange rate of HUF 250/euro 
Source: Author's calculations, based on UNCTAD. World Investment Report 2004 (2005), German-
Hungarian Industry and Trade Chamber (2005), Central Statistical Office (2005). 
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shares, which they usually have later 
tried to develop into full control.3 
 
Unlike the services and financial sec-
tors, Hungarian investments in the proc-
essing industry sometimes take the form 
of mergers, acquisitions or greenfield 
investments. Small enterprises, which have 
been founded by the thousand, used 
both of these approaches, but greenfield 
investments are more significant in this 
category. 
Some corporations that are expressly 
large in regional terms (Table 3 contains 
an incomplete list), and many micro en-
terprises, are simultaneously involved in 
Hungarian capital export. 
It follows from the differences in 
firms' sizes and capital strengths that 
large corporations cover almost the en-
tire area of the given country, or even 
handle individual countries of the region 
as part of a comprehensive regional 
                         
3 This is not necessarily the most favourable 
strategy chosen by the given Hungarian enter-
prise, but the rules of privatisation – especially 
in Slovakia before its EU membership, in Croatia 
and Serbia until now – have excluded the acqui-
sition of 100% foreign ownership. 
strategy for Central Eastern Europe and 
the Balkans. By contrast, the geographi-
cal limitations of small enterprises are 
obvious. They have 
modest capitalization, 
experiences and lan-
guage skills, and more 
or less deficient knowl-
edge of the legal and 
economic environment 
of the target country. 
That means their 
investment decisions 
can hardly ever 
overcome the bounda-
ries of their direct 
geographical environ-
ment, cross-border co-
operation and the 
Hungarian–Hungarian 
business framework. 
The market strategy 
of companies estab-
lished with Hungarian 
capital in other countries reveals some 
interesting features. The determining ob-
jective is market acquisition. That applies 
to financial, services and, industrial in-
vestments. 
In the latter category, corresponding 
to international experiences, the invest-
ments primarily improve opportunities 
for Hungarian exports. This is especially 
typical of minor enterprises, and within 
that category, commercial outlets located 
close to the border, which carry a sig-
nificant quantity of Hungarian goods. 
Other investment motives that are 
typical of international corporations are 
still underdeveloped, if they apply at all. 
The most important of these is the relo-
cation of domestic production motivated 
by cost benefits. This process is expected 
to pick up speed in the upcoming years. 
But in this regard, there is already a 
small number of investments in which 
the Hungarian company reexports some 
of the production from the neighbouring 
countries to Hungary. It can sell the 
products at a competitive price, with 
Table 2
Largest Hungarian privatisation investments abroad 
 
Year Company Purchased company Country Purchase value (million euros)
2000 Mol Rt. Slovnaft Slovakia 300 
2001 Matáv Rt. MakTel Macedonia 300 
2002 OTP Rt. IRB Slovakia 40 
2003 Mol Rt. Slovnaft(a) Slovakia 350 
2003 OTP Rt. DSK Bulgaria 280 
2003 Mol Rt. INA(b) Croatia(b) 430 
2004 Mol Rt. Slovnaft(c) Slovakia 200 
2004 TriGránit Silesia City Center Poland 110(d) 
2004 OTP Rt. Novabanka(e) Croatia(e) 236 
2005 Matáv Rt. Telekom Montenegro Montenegro 137 
Notes: (a) raise of shareholding to 70%; (b) shareholding of 25%; (c) raise 
of shareholding to 98%; (d) based on the figures of the National Bank of 
Hungary; (e) shareholding of 73% 
Source: Ministry of Economy and Transport, as quoted in Világgazdaság, 
20 July 2005 
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quality appropriate to the Hungarian 
market. 
The low raw material intensity of 
Hungarian industry is one reason why 
there are hardly any companies investing 
in neighbouring countries because of 
mineral materials available there. The 
exception is raw material for food in 
Poland, which contributed to the decision 
of a Hungarian company to start pro-
duction there. 
The medium or low technological 
quality of the region, and the unilateral 
export of technology from the West, 
have prevented any foreign investments 
associated with obtaining technology. But, 
as shown by Ukrainian examples, there 
is potential of this kind. 
Probably it is their low level of capi-
talization that has prevented Hungarian 
enterprises 
from consid-
ering in their 
strategic deci-
sions the fact 
that certain 
countries of 
the region are 
already EU 
members, two 
more could 
become mem-
bers in 2007, 
and the estab-
lishment of 
free trade 
with countries 
of Southeast 
Europe is in 
progress. 
Moreover, 
although 
Southeast 
European 
countries have 
concluded bi-
lateral free 
trade agree-
ments under 
the Stability 
Pact, and 
Ukraine offers access to the Russian 
market, these facts do not seem to have 
significantly affected investment decisions. 
3) WHAT DOES THE REGION 
OFFER? 
Both the expectations of the individual 
countries and international forecasts an-
ticipate that, if the critical level of sta-
bility at home and in the region is main-
tained, Central-Eastern and Southeast 
European countries will continue to pro-
vide the most dynamic economic growth 
in Europe. In the medium term, their 
Table 3
Market presence of selected Hungarian companies in some Central 
and Southeast European countries 
 
Company Bulgaria Croatia Poland Romania Serbia and Montenegro Slovakia Ukraine
Bábolna       X 
Danubius    X  X  
Dunapack X X X     
EGIS   X X   X 
Fornetti  X X    X 
Globus   X     
Litexco X       
Mol  X  X  X X(a) 
OTP X X    X  
Pannonplast    X   X 
Richter Gedeon   X X   X 
TriGránit X(b)  X X  X  
TVK       X(a) 
Transelektro       X 
Videoton X      X(b) 
Vegyépszer      X(b)  
Masped X(b)       
BorsodChem   X(c)     
Matáv     X(d)   
Other(s)(e)  X  X   X 
Notes: (a) terminated its activity in the meantime; (b) planned investment; (c) investment 
to be launched; (d) purchase of the telecom of Montenegro; (e) companies with major 
volume in food industry, construction industry, machine industry and consulting 
Source: Prepared by the author based on different country studies. 
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annual growth rate may be two or three 
times as high as the EU15 average. 
Accordingly, while the financing needs 
of the region are increasing, so is the 
interest of international capital. In recent 
years, Romanian and Bulgarian capital 
imports have especially jumped, mostly 
owing to increase of revenues from pri-
vatisation, but also due to greenfield ac-
tivities.4 
In addition to fast growth, this inter-
nal demand will increasingly be shaped 
by the movement of company site advan-
tages, as well as the pace and nature of 
privatisation. Regarding the latter, we see 
a mixed picture. Apart from the post-
poned privatisation of some corporations, 
Slovakia and Bulgaria have entered the 
last stage of privatisation. Poland and 
Romania are somewhere in between, 
since both still have significant state-
controlled assets. While the Romanian 
government continues privatisation un-
changed, the communication of the new 
Polish government is controversial. The 
list of companies for privatisation is still 
very long in Croatia and, most of all, in 
Serbia-Montenegro. 
Privatisation through foreign capital 
may be made dependent on certain con-
ditions. These could include partial pres-
ervation of state or domestic ownership, 
job creation, or the continued employ-
ment of the former labour force. This 
will prevent the influx of significant in-
ternational capital, detouring investments 
into the narrow domestic market that 
                         
4 At the end of 2004, the portfolio of foreign 
direct capital registered in Romania exceeded 
USD 18 billion, in Croatia the corresponding fig-
ure is 13 billion, in Bulgaria 10 billion and in 
Ukraine 9 billion. In contrast, according to UN 
figures, Serbia-Montenegro only attracted less 
than USD 4 billion. In other words, there is still 
less foreign direct investment operating in the 
whole of Southeast Europe than in Hungary 
alone. However, in upcoming years this may 
change to the benefit of Southeast Europe. If 
nothing else, the various order of magnitude of 
privatisation reserves could trigger such a 
change. 
will result in better profits in the short 
term. 
Restrictions on imports, quite signifi-
cant in more than one case, further con-
solidate this distorted structure. And 
there are cases where, realizing the re-
stricted opportunities, the foreign com-
pany will regularly take its profits out 
of the country, as opposed to initiating 
investments for development and expan-
sion. 
Every country attaches high hopes to 
the investment-stimulating effects of EU 
membership. The free-trade zone in the 
Balkans, now becoming a full-fledged 
arrangement, is similarly perceived as a 
favourable development to a lesser ex-
tent. The bigger market will stimulate the 
interest of international capital, and thus 
the competition among possible sites for 
industrial development. Production scaled 
to regional or Europe-wide dimensions 
could hardly be set up in every country 
of the region. 
As shown by the Hungarian example, 
a multinational enterprise will want to 
serve the entire region from a particular 
location unless it caters exclusively for 
the internal market. That means that 
within a reasonable time frame, it will 
not establish parallel capacities in the 
region. 
Another, probably exaggerated expec-
tation is related to the geographical relo-
cation of the existing Central European 
operations of international companies. 
This expectation is based on the assump-
tion that the EU membership of Central-
Eastern European countries will increase 
production costs, owing to requirements 
of environment protection, consumer pro-
tection and other statutes, along with 
increasing wages and appreciation of 
currencies. Therefore, multinational cor-
porations are expected to relocate their 
manufacturing and service centres to the 
East and Southeast European region, 
triggering export-driven growth in cer-
tain countries of the region. That was a 
process already witnessed in Hungary a 
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decade ago, and then in the Czech Re-
public and Slovakia as well.5 
Although we cannot rule out this sce-
nario completely, we must remember the 
restricting factors. Investment decisions – 
especially in the case of investments be-
coming technology-intensive – are driven 
by more than differences in wages or 
tax regimes. The legal, political and eco-
nomic environment, and increasingly the 
socio-cultural environment, are at least 
as important. 
In many cases, the determining factor 
in choosing a site is the development 
level of physical infrastructure and, 
within that, the time taken to reach a 
particular site. In this context, Southeast 
Europe is in a geographically adverse 
position compared to Central Europe. 
In addition, in certain countries, hu-
man infrastructure dropped below the 
critical mass, which could cause prob-
lems with capital attraction and preser-
vation.6 
Finally, the existence or lack of a 
network of suppliers significantly influ-
ences the inclination of international 
companies to move operations to a new 
country. Within specified geographical 
boundaries, a company that is not part 
of the economy of the current host 
country and does not have its own local 
production and service network is more 
likely to move its production facilities. It 
is much more difficult to relocate when 
organic relations are in place and the 
network of suppliers is in place. Recreat-
ing these in a new site would require 
substantial expenditures and long-term 
                         
5 Assuming that communications and measures 
that would discourage or deter foreign direct 
investments will not negatively effect the Hungar-
ian economic environment and policy making. 
6 Over the past decade, almost every Southeast 
European country experienced mass emigration. 
It was mostly the well-educated, young, mobile, 
flexible, entrepreneurial and risk taking labour 
force that was involved. In upcoming years, the 
lack of this community could become the biggest 
obstacle to sustainable growth and more sizeable 
capital import. 
high risks, even though, at first glance, 
the new site may offer cost benefits. 
Certainly, though, some expressly wage-
intensive production is moving east and 
southeast. Several international cor-
porations will make efforts to exploit the 
benefits of the internal market to a 
higher extent. As part of the process of 
multinational enterprises building up 
their own networks, certain supplier ac-
tivities will be relocated to East and 
Southeast European economies. And the 
East and Southeast neighbourhood of 
Hungary may mean an interesting new 
field and challenges, especially for com-
panies intending to invest in the region 
in the future. We primarily anticipate 
American and Canadian investors, but 
companies from the Far East may also 
appear. 
Two fundamental challenges of eco-
nomic policy that most countries have to 
face may remain, or even grow. 
One is the narrowing of the channels 
of foreign capital influx as privatisation 
progresses, unless new capital can be 
introduced to maintain these revenues, 
which are vital for the financing of suc-
cessful modernization and convergence. 
In this sense, EU development funds may 
be very significant. However, in the fore-
seeable future the countries of the for-
mer Yugoslavia will only capture a small 
share of this. Even more important is 
whether greenfield investments, and the 
developing and expanding activities of 
international capital will take off. The 
situations of Bulgaria and Romania seem 
more favourable here than that of 
Ukraine or the Western Balkans. 
The other dilemma is the necessity to 
shift the key driving forces of sustainable 
growth. Currently, the significant eco-
nomic growth is fed by the artificial 
stimulation of internal demands in almost 
every country. This can only be main-
tained in the short term. Exports and 
investments must become the engines of 
growth. The basic condition for that is 
not just the attraction of even more for-
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eign capital but, more importantly, the 
appearance and availability of export-
oriented multinational corporations. 
4) OUTLOOKS, OPPORTUNITIES 
AND TASKS 
While Hungarian capital operating in the 
region cannot avoid participating in 
fierce international competition and tak-
ing its chances on the market, its oppor-
tunities and investment chances are influ-
enced by certain peculiar circumstances. 
Even conservative estimates state that 
in the next five years, the stock of Hun-
garian capital operating in the region 
will double. This means that in 2010 it 
may reach EUR 11-12 billion, correspond-
ing to a capital export of about EUR 1 
billion a year. One successful, large-scale 
privatisation transaction may make this 
forecast not only achievable, but easy to 
exceed. 
Individual countries’ economic devel-
opment and transformation into market 
economies stand at various levels of ma-
turity. 
Therefore, the opportunities of capital 
export are country dependent. In some 
countries, the continuation or accelera-
tion of privatisation provides promising 
opportunities for investment. However, 
there are countries where a simpler and 
more transparent legal framework might 
lead to beneficial results. That is espe-
cially owing to the necessities deriving 
from EU membership or preparation for 
membership. 
It should also be anticipated that the 
improvement of regional market condi-
tions – free trade – will begin to have a 
role in Hungarian companies’ investment 
decisions. Experiences so far, and the 
gradually evolving institutional and per-
sonal corporate networks, can be used 
to support these decisions. 
Certain new aspects also should be 
taken into account in Hungarian politics 
and economic policy. The net capital im-
port needs of the Hungarian economy 
should be met, even with increasing 
capital exports. For that, EU funds and 
the continuing lively foreign capital in-
flux provide a reliable basis. On the 
other hand, steps must be taken in ad-
vance to prevent job losses in Hungary 
owing to Hungarian capital relocating to 
neighbouring countries. A structural up-
grading is necessary, shifting domestic 
production to higher added value and 
more technology-intensive activities. This 
requires future planning by companies 
and an appropriate governmental eco-
nomic policy. 
Moreover – and only partly owing to 
demographic problems – regional capital 
relationships should be more and more 
assessed from the point of view of avail-
able human capital. And not in the form 
of traditional labour force imports, but 
by outsourcing of production to enable 
the involvement of this labour potential 
into the increasingly competitive activities 
of Hungarian companies. 
While most Hungarian “regional mul-
tinationals” have carefully elaborated 
strategies, small and medium-sized enter-
prises require significant training and 
preparation. Some are certain to surpass 
the levels reached by now. They will 
want more than just a local niche mar-
ket. 
Progress should be made in three ar-
eas. Hungarian companies with settled 
bases abroad should be encouraged to 
integrate in the supplier network of mul-
tinational corporations operating in the 
region. Second, they may require assis-
tance when they take some of their pro-
duction abroad, owing to cost benefits, 
aiming to serve the Hungarian market 
from there. Finally, the build-up of a 
network between Hungarian small and 
mid-sized enterprises operating abroad 
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and small and mid-sized enterprises of 
the host country should be supported 
adequately. This can be one of the sig-
nificant tools of regional expansion, and 
sometimes even a key factor of success-
ful performance in the EU. In order to 
implement the above-mentioned targets, a 
decisive role has to be attached to capi-
tal-export-supporting Hungarian govern-
ment institutions. One part of this struc-
ture has been established long ago, as 
the Budapest headquarter of ITD-
Hungary and its regional offices cover 
almost all countries of Central and 
Southeast Europe. The credit policy of 
the Eximbank belongs to this structure 
as well. Similarly, essential tasks will be 
assumed by Corvinus Investment Bank, 
especially focusing on providing active 
support to Hungarian capital export. 
EU membership and the continued ter-
ritorial expansion of integration carries 
potential benefits. Economic policy and 
diplomacy have significant tasks in this 
field, too. National development plans 
should be coordinated, both in the area 
of cross-border cooperation (euro-
regions) and the infrastructure and envi-
ronmental developments covering the en-
tire East and Southeast European region. 
This applies not only to existing EU 
member states, such as Slovakia or Po-
land, and not only to Romania and Bul-
garia, but also to the Western Balkans, 
a region managing other Union re-
sources. 
When it comes to improving the envi-
ronment for Hungarian capital export, 
the transfer of EU-related Hungarian ex-
perience in an organized framework, 
such as courses, professional training, 
twinning programs and successful appli-
cation for EU funds, may have a special 
and efficient, albeit indirect role. 
The existing and potential build-up of 
sites also assumes active economic diplo-
macy. There is strong competition in the 
region to capture the best investments, 
but potential alliances are available in 
this competition. The opportunities of 
concerted action should be considered 
with Italian, Slovenian, Greek and Turk-
ish capital, and enterprises active in 
Southeast Europe, as well as with Polish 
firms focusing on East Europe, and with 
Slovak and Romanian partners. 
5) FINAL REMARKS 
The increasing presence of Hungarian 
capital in neighbouring countries also 
depends on preserving and enhancing the 
stability of the region, as does sustain-
able economic growth in Hungary in 
general. Focusing on the future envi-
ronmental conditions of capital export, 
the stability of the region has increased 
in recent years, but we cannot exclude 
reversals. 
It is likely that privatisation will con-
tinue, even accelerate in certain coun-
tries. Decisions on privatisation will be 
shaped – as everywhere – not only by 
economic but also by political considera-
tions. That is a reason why Hungarian 
diplomacy should play an active role. 
Another key requirement for success-
ful Hungarian capital export is that it 
should be increasingly based on business 
considerations, and should not be ethni-
cally driven. The system of incentives in 
Hungarian economic policy should be 
developed and enhanced in this regard. 
Close economic relations in general, and 
capital relationships in particular, can 
weaken or eliminate historically developed 
and inherited negative stereotypes. In 
addition to the direct economic benefits, 
the dynamically expanding Hungarian 
capital export in the region will also 
produce these benefits. 
 
* * * * * 
 
 
